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Notes
CONFLICT OF LAws-DIvORCE-JURISDICTION
Husband and wife were married in New York in 1940, re-
mained there for several years, and then moved to France. In
1953, the wife returned to New York and instituted this suit
for a divorce, relying on a New York statute conferring juris-
diction to divorce upon the state courts "where the parties were
married within this state."' The husband was given notice of the
suit by publication and made a special appearance to contest the
court's jurisdiction. Held, the celebration of a marriage within
a state empowers that state to divorce the parties. David-Zie-
seniss v. Zieseniss, 205 Misc. 836, 129 N.Y.S.2d 649 (Sup. Ct.
1954).
The Supreme Court of the United States decided in Williams
v. North Carolina 12 that a divorce decree rendered in the state
where the plaintiff was domiciled when the suit was instituted
is entitled to full faith and credit in other states. Most writers
believe that a divorce decree rendered at the defendant's domi-
cile is similarly entitled to full faith and credit. 3 The Supreme
Court has also held that, when the defendant in a divorce pro-
ceeding contests the court's jurisdiction 4 or enters a general
appearance,5 the principles of res judicata prevent him from
questioning the jurisdiction of the court in another proceeding.
The court has never decided that, either for purposes of full
faith and credit or solely under the due process clause of the
fourteenth amendment, the state where the plaintiff or defen-
dant is domiciled is the only one which has jurisdiction to grant
the parties a divorce. But there are statements in its decisionse
and assertions by certain writers7 to that effect. Moreover, some
1. N.Y. CIVIL PRACTICE ACT § 1147(2).
2. 317 U.S. 287 (1942).
3. RESTATEMENT, CONFLICT OF LAWS § 113 (Supp. 1948); STUMBERG, PRIN-
CIPLES OF CONFLICT OF LAWS 295 (2d ed. 1951). But see Comment, 14 LOUISIANA
LAW REVIEW 257 (1953).
4. Sherrer v. Sherrer, 334 U.S. 343 (1948).
5. Coe v. Coe, 334 U.S. 378 (1948); see also Johnson v. Muelberger, 340
U.S. 581 (1951).
6. "Under our system of law, judicial power to grant a divorce-juris-
diction strictly speaking-is founded on domicil." Williams v. North Caro-
lina II, 325 U.S. 226, 229 (1945); see also id. at 239; Sherrer v. Sherrer, 334
U.S. 343, 349 (1948).
7. GOODRICH, HANDBOOK OF THE CONFLICT OF LAWS 395 (3d ed. 1949); STUM-
BERG, PRINCIPLES OF CONFLICT OF LAWS 295 (2d ed. 1951); see also RESTATEMENT,
CONFLICT OF LAWS § 110 (1934).
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courts have held unconstitutional legislative attempts to pro-
vide a basis for divorce jurisdiction other than the actual exist-
ence of one party's domicile within the territory at the time of
suit.8 A recent decision of the Supreme Court has invalidated
such an attempt by the legislature of the Virgin Islands, osten-
sibly on the narrow grounds that Congress had simply not given
the Virgin Islands any such power. A strong dissent attempted
to show, however, that the court had in fact decided, erroneously,
that domicile is an essential ingredient of divorce jurisdiction.9
The court in the instant case applied the New York statute
literally and exercised jurisdiction solely because "the parties
were married within this state."10 It considered the celebration
of a marriage within the state as establishing a permanent rela-
tionship between the parties and the state of sufficient impor-
tance to serve as the basis of divorce jurisdiction. The court also
reasoned that, since the validity of a marriage is usually deter-
mined in accordance with the law of the place of its celebration,
that place should also be "an appropriate place for determining
whether or not and for what causes the marriage may be dis-
solved."11 The court took note of Alton v. Alton,12 in which the
Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit stated that domicile of one
of the parties was essential to divorce jurisdiction. That decision
held unconstitutional a territorial statute making six weeks' resi-
dence prima facie proof of domicile in the Virgin Islands and also
allowing Virgin Islands courts to divorce parties who were both
before the court. This statute is the one recently declared invalid
on other grounds by the Supreme Court in Granville-Smith v.
Granville-Smith.1 3 The court in the instant case also considered
Jennings v. Jennings,14 in which an Alabama court declared un-
constitutional a statute allowing the courts of that state to
divorce nonresidents whenever both parties were before the
court. Both decisions were distinguished as cases where there
8. Alton v. Alton, 207 F.2d 667 (3d Cir. 1953), 14 LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW
893 (1954), judgment vacated, 347 U.S. 610 (1954); Jennings v. Jennings, 251
Ala. 73, 36 So.2d 236 (1948).
9. Granville-Smith v. Granville-Smith, 75 Sup. Ct. 553, 561 (1955).
10. N.Y. CIVIL PRACTICE ACT § 1147(2). It is not entirely certain that the
intent of the legislature was to make marriage within the state sufficient.
See cases cited Note, 54 COLUM. L. REV. 1165 (1954).
11. David-Zieseniss v. Zieseniss, 205 Misc. 836, 129 N.Y.S.2d 649, 655 (Sup.
Ct. 1954).
12. 207 F.2d 667 (3d Cir. 1953), 14 LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW 893 (1954), judg-
ment vacated, 347 U.S. 610 (1954).
13. 75 Sup. Ct. 553 (1955).
14. 251 Ala. 73, 36 So.2d 236 (1948).
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was no connection between the marriage and the forum which
could reasonably serve as the basis of jurisdiction when the
possibility of domicile had been ruled out.
Although the need for deciding the question was not present
in the instant case and the court seems to have deliberately
avoided stating its views in this regard, 5 it is submitted that the
court's decree would not be entitled to full faith and credit in
another state. This seems to be implicit in the decisions of the
Supreme Court discussed above. In general, indications are that
the Court will accept a state's claim to jurisdiction, for purposes
of full faith and credit, only when the state has sufficient interest
in the matter in controversy. 16 Consequently, even were the
Supreme Court to recognize some basis other than domicile for
jurisdiction to render a divorce decree entitled to full faith and
credit, it would not seem that a state acquires sufficient interest
in a marriage, solely by reason of its celebration there, to ren-
der such a decree.17 Some writers believe that the requirements
of jurisdiction for purposes of due process under the fourteenth
amendment are the same as those of the full faith and credit
clause.' Under this view, the court's decree in the instant case
would be invalid in New York if, as submitted, it is not en-
titled to full faith and credit elsewhere. On the other hand,
there is some authority for the view that, while the decree might
not be entitled to full faith and credit, the court's exercise
of jurisdiction might still satisfy the requirements of due pro-
cess.19 What these requirements are cannot be readily stated.
15. David-Zieseniss v. Zieseniss, 205 Misc. 836, 129 N.Y.S.2d 649, 654 (Sup.
Ct. 1954).
16. See, e.g., Pink v. A.A.A. Highway Express, Inc., 314 U.S. 201 (1941);
Alaska Packers Ass'n v. Industrial Accident Comm., 294 U.S. 532 (1935);
Bradford Electric Co. v. Clapper, 286 U.S. 145, 163 (1945) (especially con-
curring opinion).
17. The instant case may later be explained as one based on the fact
that the parties had made New York their domicile for several years after
marriage and thus gave the state a greater interest in the marriage
than it would have from its mere celebration there. But nothing in the
court's opinion supports such an explanation.
18. Griswold, Divorce Jurisdiction and Recognition of Divorce Decrees-
A Comparative Study, 65 HARV. L. REV. 193, 212 n. 57 (1951); The Work
of the Louisiana Supreme Court for the 1952-1953 Term-Persons, 14
LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW 114 (1953); Comment, 14 LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW 257,
265 (1953); Note, 68 HARV. L. REV. 543 (1955); see also Alton v. Alton, 207
F.2d 667 (3d Cir. 1953), 14 LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW 893 (1954); Crownover v.
Crownover, 58 N.M. 597, 274 P.2d 127 (1954).
19. Justice Frankfurter, dissenting, has said: "A divorce may satisfy
due process requirements and be valid where rendered, and still lack the
jurisdictional requisites for full faith and credit to be mandatory." Sherrer
v. Sherrer, 334 U.S. 343, 368, n. 16 (1948); see also Comment, 39 CORN. L.Q.
293, 299 (1954); Powell, And Repent at Leisure-An Inquiry into the Unhappy
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But the theory of the court in the instant case that the mere
fact that a marriage has been celebrated within the state creates
a lingering res over which the state may exercise jurisdiction
is not convincing. Moreover, while it is true, as the court pointed
out, that some states have exercised jurisdiction to annul a
marriage solely on the grounds that the marriage was cele-
brated within the state, there seems to be a fundamental differ-
ence between annulment and divorce proceedings. 20 The court's
suggestion that the parties had impliedly consented to its juris-
diction by marriage within the state seems equally question-
able, since it is generally agreed that jurisdiction to divorce
cannot be conferred even by express consent of the parties. 21
However, the possible effects of defendant's special appear-
ance to contest the court's jurisdiction should not be overlooked.
Under the principles of res judicata, this appearance may oper-
ate to bar the parties from later attacking the decree if the
proceeding terminated with the instant decision. However, 'the
Supreme Court has thus far applied the doctrine of res judi-
cata only to cases where, after the defendant appeared and
either questioned or admitted the existence of plaintiff's domi-
cile as a jurisdictional requirement, the court rendering the
divorce decree did not attempt to base its jurisdiction on any-
thing but domicile.2 2 It is a different case when the court bases
its jurisdiction on a denial that the existence of a party's domi-
cile within the territory is essential, as the court in the instant
case did. The Restatement of Judgments states that where a
court having jurisdiction over the parties determines that it
has jurisdiction over the subject matter, the parties cannot col-
laterally attack this determination "unless the policy under-
lying the doctrine of res judicata is outweighed by the policy
Lot of Those Whom Nevada Hath Joined Together and North Carolina Hath
Put Asunder, 58 HARV. L. REv. 930, 936 (1945).
20. An annulment decree merely declares that the marriage relation-
ship never came into existence because it did not comply with the law of
the state where the ceremony took place. This would seem to be some
justification for a state's exercising jurisdiction in an action for annulment
on the basis of the parties' having been married there. A divorce decree,
however, admits the validity of the marriage, but purports to dissolve that
relationship by reason of events which occurred subsequently and in accord-
ance with the law where the action is brought. Thus in the latter case
It would seem that there should be some present connection with the forum
where the divorce action is being brought in order to give the forum a
sufficient interest on which to exercise jurisdiction to dissolve the rela-
tionship. See STUMBERG, PRINCIPLES OF CONFLICT OF LAWS 321, 324 (2d ed. 1951).
21. See note 8 supra.
22. Sherrer v. Sherrer, 334 U.S. 343 (1948); Coe v. Coe, 334 U.S. 378
(1948),
NOTES
against permitting the court to act beyond its jurisdiction."
Significantly, among the factors listed that might justify permit-
ting such collateral attack is "the fact that the determination
as to jurisdiction depended upon a question of law rather than
of fact.
23
In conclusion, it may be said that the court's suggestion
that all states adopt the rule laid down in its decision seems
neither sound nor likely to be accepted. Should the court's
decree be entitled to full faith and credit, one more step in the
encouragement of migratory divorces would be taken. If it is
valid in New York but not entitled to full faith and credit
elsewhere, an unfortunate instability in the status of the parties
as they move from state to state has been made possible.
Maynard E. Cush
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-CONSTITUTIONALITY OF LOUISIANA DIRECT
ACTION STATUTE-SUITS ON OUT-OF-STATE CONTRACTS
CONTAINING No-ACTION CLAUSES
Plaintiff, a Louisiana resident, brought a direct action against
defendant insurer, a British corporation, to recover damages for
injuries resulting from the use in Louisiana of a product manu-
factured by the insured, a Delaware corporation. Suit was
removed to the federal district court on the ground of diversity.
The contract of insurance was issued in Massachusetts and de-
livered there and to a subsidiary corporation in Illinois. It con-
tained a provision, valid and enforceable in Massachusetts and
Illinois, prohibiting actions against the insurer until the amount
of the insured's obligation to pay had been determined either
by judgment against the insured or by written agreement. As a
condition to doing business in Louisiana, the defendant insurer
had consented to be sued' under the Louisiana direct action
23. RESTATEMENT, JUDGMENTS § 10 (1942). The date of the Restatement
of course indicates that the American Law Institute did not have in mind
the problems of divorce jurisdiction that have recently arisen. The 1948
supplement to the Restatement does not alter the section quoted. However,
the original comment (b) of this section states: "[Ihf a suit for divorce is
brought in the court of a justice of the peace, which has no jurisdiction
to grant a divorce, and judgment is given granting the divorce, the judg-
ment is void and subject to collateral attack even though the defendant ap-
peared in the action and the question of the jurisdiction of the court to
grant a divorce was litigated and determined adversely to the defendant."
1. Consent is required under La. Acts 1950, No. 542, p. 986, now LA. R.S.
22:983E (1950): "No certificate of authority to do business in Louisiana shall
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